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Over the centuries, magicians have developed extensive knowledge about themanipulation
of the humanmind—knowledge that has been largely ignored by psychology. It has recently
been argued that this knowledge could help improve our understanding of human cognition
and consciousness. But how might this be done? And how much could it ultimately
contribute to the exploration of the human mind?We propose here a framework outlining
how knowledge about magic can be used to help us understand the human mind. Various
approaches—both old and new—are surveyed, in terms of four different levels. The ﬁrst
focuses on the methods in magic, using these to suggest new approaches to existing
issues in psychology. The second focuses on the effects that magic can produce, such
as the sense of wonder induced by seeing an apparently impossible event. Third is the
consideration of magic tricks—methods and effects together—as phenomena of scientiﬁc
interest in their own right. Finally, there is the organization of knowledge about magic into
an informative whole, including the possibility of a science centered around the experience
of wonder.
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Magic is among the oldest of the performing arts. Given its con-
cernwith“creating illusions of the impossible”(Nelms, 1969/1996,
p. 1), its practitioners—magicians—have had considerable oppor-
tunity to explore various ways of manipulating people’s thoughts,
beliefs and perceptual experiences. The tricks and illusions result-
ing from this exploration are remarkably powerful, and have
bafﬂed audiences all over the world. They have also piqued the
interest of scientists, including some of the earliest pioneers in
psychology (see Hyman, 1989; Lamont, 2010). For example, Binet
(1894) studied the techniques of several eminent magicians via
the most careful measurements possible at that time. Among
other things, he used the newly developed chronophotographic
gun to investigate sleight of hand, discovering several of the
perceptual mechanisms involved (see Lachapelle, 2008). Others,
such as Triplett (1900), investigated speciﬁc magic illusions, and
showed how just the suggestion of an action can trigger an illusory
percept.
Although scientiﬁc interest in magic later waned, it never
disappeared completely (see Hyman, 1989; Lamont and Wise-
man, 1999); indeed, a new wave of interest has recently arisen.
For instance, Kuhn and colleagues used eye tracking to explore
our failure to see particular events during magic tricks (e.g.,
Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Kuhn et al., 2009). Others investigated
how misdirection (e.g., curved motion) can result in oculomo-
tor behaviors that alter perception (Otero-Millan et al., 2011).
Tracking of magicians’ eyes has revealed how social cues can drive
our attention and perception (Kuhn et al., 2009; Cui et al., 2011).
Additionally, investigations into the Indian rope trick have shown
how memories of apparently impossible events can be related
to memory distortions over time (Wiseman and Lamont, 1996;
Wiseman and Greening, 2005).
Magic has also been used to investigate higher-level processes,
such as belief formation and reasoning. For example, Benassi
et al. (1980) showed that exposure to magic tricks (portrayed as
demonstrations of psychic powers) increased belief in psychic phe-
nomena (also see Mohr et al., 2014). Subbotsky (2010) used magic
demonstrations to investigate magical thinking in both children
and adults. Magic has even been used to explore the neural basis
of causality (Parris et al., 2009), the origins of insightful thinking
(Danek et al., 2013, 2014), and the nature of freewill (Shalom et al.,
2013).
Yet despite all this, research involving magic has remained
scattered, with little or no attempt to connect the results of var-
ious studies, compare methodologies, suggest which new lines
of research are promising, or determine how magic might best be
used to study the humanmind. It has recently been argued that it is
time for scientists andmagicians to studymagic in amore scientiﬁc
way, and develop connections to the other sciences involved with
perception and cognition (Kuhn et al., 2008; Macknik et al., 2008).
But how might this be done? And to what extent could magic
ultimately contribute to our exploration of the human mind?
In this paper we propose a framework that describes many of
the approaches that have been—or could be—taken to use magic
to investigate human perception and cognition. This framework
organizes these approaches into four different levels, ordered by
the complexity of the issues involved. Theﬁrst concerns adaptation
of traditionalmagic techniques to help investigate current research
issues. The second involves the nature of those effects that magic
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is uniquely suited for, such as the sense of wonder induced by
an apparently impossible event. The third considers magic tricks
as phenomena of scientiﬁc interest in their own right. The ﬁnal
level concerns the possibility of larger-scale patterns among magic
tricks. We show that this framework cannot only collect and orga-
nize virtually all the work to date that has used magic to study
the human mind, but also points toward a coherent program of
research that could lead to interesting new avenues of research.
APPLICATION OF MAGIC TECHNIQUES
Magicians have experimented with distorting reality for millen-
nia (see Christopher and Christopher, 2006). They are not the
only ones who do so: ﬁlm directors, for instance, can manip-
ulate our sense of time and space in ways that are often quite
similar (Kinsley, 1993), and pickpockets can manipulate their vic-
tim’s tactile awareness using techniques that parallel those of the
conjuror. Such convergences suggest that many of the techniques
involved rely on perceptual and cognitive effects that are quite
general.
Two aspects of a magic trick are of central importance. The
ﬁrst is the effect—the phenomena consciously experienced by the
spectator (e.g., seeing a deck of cards rifﬂed by a magician; seeing
a chosen card emerge from the magician’s pocket). The second is
the method—the manipulations used by the magician to achieve
the effect (e.g., the particular way the cards are rifﬂed; the placing
of the card in the pocket ahead of time). In general, any effect
can usually be produced by several different methods; conversely,
any method can help create different effects (see, e.g., Tarbell,
1927/1971). Importantly, if a magic trick is to work, its method
must be powerful enough to fool virtually an entire audience.
As such, these methods—and their associated effects—could be
harnessed to empirically investigate issues in perception, cogni-
tion, and other aspects of the human mind. Their applications
can be readily grouped according to the perceptual and cognitive
mechanisms involved.
PERCEPTION
Object constancy
Developmental psychologists have long depended on magic meth-
ods for conjuring—making objects seem to disappear and reap-
pear. For example, in the violation-of-expectation paradigm, the
researcher may cover an object with a barrier, and then remove it
to reveal that the object has disappeared; the assumption is that if
infants have a sense of object constancy (i.e., objects continue to
exist when out of sight), they should be surprised by the appar-
ently impossible event. This paradigm has been used to investigate
infants’ understanding of the physical world in general, ranging
from the idea that objects cannot occupy the same space (pene-
tration effect) to the concept that stable objects need a support
of some kind (see Baillargeon, 1994). Related tricks have similarly
been used to duplicate objects, allowing researchers to pretend
they had a magical photocopy machine (Hood and Bloom, 2008).
Such techniques have also been used to investigate cognition
in adults. For example, in a study on choice blindness (Johansson
et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2010), participants were shown a pair of
objects and asked to select the one they preferred. The selected
object was then switched for the other one using a magic trick, so
that this switch wasn’t noticed; participants then defended their
“choice” by confabulating reasons why the switched object was
superior to the originally selected one. The success of this approach
relied on the conviction of the participants that the object could
not have changed. While conventional techniques could have used
images of objects on a computer screen, magic tricks allowed this
to be done with physical objects, creating a much stronger belief
that the object did not change, likely because there are far fewer
ways for this to have occurred.
Visual attention
Another important aspect of magic is the control of visual atten-
tion, which determines what an observer consciously sees (Kuhn
et al., 2008, 2014; Rensink, 2010, 2015). Various methods can be
used for this. For instance, Kuhn et al. (2009) manipulated the
direction of themagician’s gaze, inﬂuencingwhat participants saw.
Another study found that individuals with autism were slower to
ﬁxate the face of the magician and less likely to follow gaze, sug-
gesting that they were less efﬁcient at using social cues (Kuhn
et al., 2010). In both examples, magic provided a natural context
inwhich to study these issues,without sacriﬁcing any experimental
control.
Many magic tricks use attentional misdirection to prevent an
observer from detecting a visually salient event. This can be har-
nessed as well. For example, misdirection prevented participants
from noticing a magician dropping a lighter onto his lap (Kuhn
et al., 2008). The probability of noticing this was a natural mea-
sure of the effectiveness of the misdirection, allowing researchers
to determine the effectiveness of different misdirection principles
in controlling attention. (For a full review see Kuhn and Martinez,
2012).
Although several studies have investigated attentional control,
only a small fraction of its potential has been explored to date.
For example, researchers have largely ignored the inﬂuence of
linguistic cues, although these can be readily studied (Teszka
et al., 2010). Misdirection principles relating to body language
and gesture likewise go beyond the issues generally investigated
at present. Magicians also misdirect attention by using humor to
create periods of attentional relaxation (e.g., Ortiz, 1994), another
phenomenon apparently not yet investigated.
The experience of magicians shows that attention can also be
controlled by factors at even higher levels of processing (Sharpe,
1988; Kuhn and Tatler, 2011; Kuhn and Martinez, 2012; Kuhn
et al., 2014). For example, the principle of naturalness states that
people are less suspicious of natural than unnatural actions, and
so take less notice of the former (Sharpe, 1988). People likewise
pay less attention to actions that are justiﬁed. Phenomena such as
these are likely worth studying in a more rigorous way.
Expectation in vision
Although attention is an important factor governing what we
consciously see, it is not the only one; another is expectation
(e.g., Braun, 2001). This stems from the fact that much of
perception must anticipate what will happen in the immediate
future (Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2004), as well as compensate for
processing delays (Cavanagh, 1997). Our conscious experience
likely reﬂects the expectations created by these predictions.
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology February 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1508 | 2
Rensink and Kuhn Using magic to study the mind
The importance of expectation has been known to magi-
cians for years. For example, in “The Vanishing Ball” (Figure 1),
a ball seemingly vanishes while being thrown upward by the
magician. This effect relies on the expectation that the ball
actually is thrown upward (see, e.g., Triplett, 1900; Kuhn
and Land, 2006); if this expectation exists, the observer will
consciously experience the ball, even though no visual stim-
uli exist. Interestingly, the experience of the ball disappears
while attention is being given to the illusory ball, indicat-
ing that attention alone cannot keep the underlying perceptual
structures active. The methods used to create such vanishes
could likely be adapted to explore these matters further—e.g.,
articulating the role played by expectation in visual experi-
ence, or perhaps mapping out the nature of the expectations
themselves.
Visual illusions
Magic tricks often rely on illusions of various kinds (e.g., Sharpe,
1985). Many of these are based on well-known mechanisms, such
as Gestalt laws of grouping, which can enable items to “disappear”
via incorporation into larger-scale structures (Barnhart, 2010).
However, some tricks use sophisticated methods that are not as
well known. For instance, the techniques used in Pepper’s ghost
illusion can make an object appear and disappear in full view of
the spectator, or even seem to change into something else entirely
(Christopher and Christopher, 2006). Such methods could be the
basis for new kinds of investigation into visual perception.
COGNITION
Hypothesis formation
Acritical element of anymagic trick ismisdirection—manipulating
the spectator away from the cause of the effect (e.g., Hugard, 1960;
de Ascanio, 1964; Wonder and Minch, 1996; Crone, 1999; Kuhn
and Martinez, 2012; Kuhn et al., 2014). This concept is a broad
one, in that many kinds of mechanisms in the human mind are
involved in making sense of incoming information. At the level
of perception, misdirection often takes the form of attentional
control (see Perception). But misdirection also applies to higher-
level mechanisms, such as those enabling our understanding or
memory of a situation (see Kuhn et al., 2014). Factors such as
pre-existing knowledge and assumptions clearly play a role in this.
Misdirection could help investigate how such factors interact.
Misdirection in theVanishing Ball creates a hypothesis differing
considerably from reality. It can likewise induce compelling—but
untrue—explanations at higher levels (Lamont, 2013). Several
interesting issues could be explored here. For example, why
is a given explanation initially accepted over others that seem
equally suitable? What counts as adequate evidence? Could several
hypotheses be considered at the same time? Such methods might
also help us understand phenomena such as conﬁrmation bias, in
which evidence supporting existing beliefs is favored in some way
(Nickerson, 1998).
Memory
Conjurors often use suggestion to manipulate the spectator’s
memories of a performance. A striking example of this can be
found in eyewitness reports of the Indian rope trick, in which
a magician levitates a long piece of rope, which an assistant
then climbs. It is extremely unlikely that this trick was ever per-
formed the way it is reported; instead, it appears to be a result
of false memories (Wiseman and Lamont, 1996). More gener-
ally, memory distortions can prevent observers from recollecting
a true sequence of events, and thus, from discovering the method
behind an effect. This can be done in several ways: subtle details
could be altered (e.g., forgetting or falsely remembering details
that never took place), or the effect itself may be exaggerated
(e.g., stating that ﬁve rather than three lemons appeared under
the cup).
Wiseman and Greening (2005) investigated how recollection
of an event could be inﬂuenced by such suggestions. Partici-
pants watched a video of a magician performing a psychoki-
netic key-bending trick. After the key-bending was completed
and the bent key placed on the table, half the participants
were given an additional suggestion implying that the key
was still bending. Participants who received this suggestion
were more likely to report having seen the key bend on the
table.
These kinds of manipulations are extremely powerful; con-
trolled investigation based upon them could therefore shed
interesting new light on the mechanisms underlying memory.
Among other things, they may reveal interesting individual differ-
ences by which memory distortions occur. As such, they may also
have important practical applications—for example, highlighting
limitations in the reliability of eyewitness testimonies.
FIGURE 1 |TheVanishing Ball: (A)The magician is holding a small ball.
(B–E) He throws the ball in the air twice, following its trajectory with his gaze.
(F) He pretends to throw the ball, but actually retains it in his hand; mean-
while, he looks up, following the expected trajectory of the ball. The ball is
typically seen as traveling upward and then vanishing. (G)The magician
pretends that both hands are empty. Figure from Friebertshauser et al. (2014).
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Problem solving
Although magicians often go to great lengths to prevent people
from discovering a method, this still happens on occasion. When
it does, the trick fails. This is often accompanied by an Aha experi-
ence, a strong feeling that a solution has been found, along with a
certainty that this solution is correct. This is an example of insight
(Sternberg and Davidson, 1995; Bowden et al., 2005).
Insightful problem solving has typically been investigated
using verbal problems or simple puzzles (Knoblich et al., 1999).
However, such tasks are sometimes considered overly restricted
(MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008). A possible way around
this was proposed by Danek et al. (2013, 2014), who developed
a battery of magic tricks for which the method could be dis-
covered relatively easily. Participants watched videos of these
tricks and tried to discover how they were done. Correct solu-
tions were accompanied by an Aha experience almost 40% of
the time, suggesting they were found through insightful problem
solving.
Danek et al. (2013, 2014) argue that this approach offers sev-
eral advantages over traditional ones (see also Demacheva et al.,
2012). Among other things, they ﬁnd that participants in their
experiments are highly motivated to ﬁnd the correct solution—
once most people have observed a magic trick, they strongly
wish to know how it was done. This motivation may be due to
the experience of a phenomenon violating expectations about
how the world works (e.g., seeing an object suddenly vanish),
something not characteristic of verbal material or puzzles. It
would be interesting to see whether this is also true outside
the lab; according to Ortiz (1994), magic and puzzle-solving
differ precisely along the dimension of emotional engagement,
regardless of location. It would also be interesting to see if the
attitudes of magicians to puzzle-solving are similar to those of
non-magicians.
OTHER
Agency and free will
We generally feel we have control over the decisions and choices
we make. But the extent to which we actually control our
behavior has been heavily debated. Studies have shown that
behavior can be inﬂuenced by subliminal (unseen) cues (e.g.,
Lau and Passingham, 2007). But while such ﬁndings are reli-
able, the effects tend to be small, and so they are often
discounted.
Meanwhile, inﬂuencing choice without the awareness of the
inﬂuence—an effect known as forcing—is a major part of conjur-
ing (Sharpe, 1988). For example, a magician may ask you to select
a card. Although you may feel that your selection was a free one
(i.e., a one in 52 chance of selecting that particular card), it was in
fact largely predetermined (see, e.g., Kuhn et al., 2008).
In contrast to the relatively small effects created by subliminal
cues, effects due to forcing can be quite large. For instance, Olson
et al. (2013) and Shalom et al. (2013) used a popular forcing tech-
nique based on the duration the cards are shown. Results showed
that the choice of card couldbe strongly affected, evenwhenpartic-
ipants were unaware of the manipulation. These effects are large
enough to potentially have applications in the real world (e.g.,
advertising).
Motor skills
Skilled magicians spend hours practicing methods such as sleight
of hand (Rissanen et al., 2013, 2014). This has much in com-
mon with practicing an instrument: countless hours are devoted
to rehearsing particular movement patterns. Much of what we
know about skill acquisition is obtained from studying expertise
in domains ranging from sports to chess (Didierjean and Gobet,
2008). The particular dexterity and motor skills needed for magic
would be a natural addition to this list; since these skills differ
from those of other kinds of expert, the results would likely be of
interest.
For example, Cavina-Pratesi et al. (2011) investigated pan-
tomime movements of magicians. While normal people are
generally quite poor at faking grasping, the fake movements of
magicians were indistinguishable from real ones, suggesting that
extensive practice results in different visuomotor—and possibly
even visuospatial—mechanisms. Another useful skill is control
of hand-eye co-ordination. In everyday life we tend to look
at whatever we are manipulating (Hayhoe et al., 2003; Land,
2006). But because attentional misdirection often depends on the
active manipulation of gaze (Kuhn and Land, 2006; Kuhn et al.,
2009), magicians must learn to decouple eyes and actions. An
interesting issue is the extent to which such decoupling can be
achieved.
More generally, it would be interesting to explore the motor
skills of magicians in the same way that skills are studied in
other domains, such as sports (Land and McLeod, 2000) or music
(Furneaux and Land, 1999). Since magicians learn their skills
in a variety of ways (books, videos, personal training), there is
also potential in examining how the style of learning affects skill
development. To date, however, surprisingly few researchers have
utilized this highly specialized andpotentially valuable population.
Social aspects of expertise
In a related vein, it may also be worth using magicians to inves-
tigate the social aspects of the development of expertise. Most
domains—such as sports or music—have formal educational
resources in which expertise is developed. Magic is unusual in
that there are few formal ways in which it can be learnt (i.e.,
few formal magic schools). Although the advent of social media
has changed things to some extent, magicians are still generally
reluctant to share their secrets with non-magicians, creating addi-
tional challenges. However, Rissanen et al. (2013) interviewed over
a hundred professional magicians about the social network within
which this expertise develops; results showed an interesting set
of informal, yet intricate master–student relationships. Thus, the
study of expertise in magic could provide a useful way to explore
how specialized and secretive knowledge is shared1.
Magic and therapy
In recent years there has been considerable interest in using magic
techniques as therapeutic tools (see Harte and Spencer, 2014). For
1There is an interesting parallel with the scientiﬁc community, which is uses a similar
mentoring system to train new practitioners, and which—at least in its phases prior
to publication—often maintains a degree of secrecy. Both communities also honor
members who make signiﬁcant contributions (often after years of work), and look
down upon members who steal ideas.
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example, most traditional therapies for children with hemiplegic
cerebral palsy require repetitive and laborious actions, reducing
compliance. But because children are keenly interested in learn-
ing magic tricks, therapeutic approaches involving the learning of
sleight of hand result in signiﬁcantly improvedmotor skills (Green
et al., 2013). Magic has likewise been used as a therapeutic tool in
pediatric counseling (Bowman, 1986), mental health (Lyons and
Menolotto, 1990), psychotherapy (Moskowitz, 1973), and den-
tistry (Peretz and Gluck, 2005). A better scientiﬁc understanding
of magic techniques might also help develop therapeutic tools in
many other domains (e.g., social phobias, autism).
NATURE OF MAGIC EFFECTS
Another set of approaches focuses not on the use of magic to
study other phenomena, but on the nature of the magic effects
themselves. Many effects can be produced only—or at least, far
more effectively—via magic; as such, these could lead to issues
of various kinds. Since these effects often push our perceptual
and cognitive processes to their limits, the results could be highly
illuminating.
MAGICAL THINKING
An important part of magic is that its effects appear inexplica-
ble; indeed, magic is sometimes deﬁned as “creating illusions
of the impossible” (Nelms, 1969/1996, p. 1). Such inexplicabil-
ity could help us understand various aspects of cognition, such
as the formation of belief systems. Whereas adults are generally
skeptical, children tend to have a rich fantasy life with many magi-
cal elements—e.g., a belief in supernatural beings (Rosengren and
Hickling,1994). Suchmagical thinking is thought toplay an impor-
tant role in the development of cognition, inwhich“precausal”and
magical explanations of the world are gradually replaced by causal
ones (Piaget, 1927; Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962).
Although work on this issue has traditionally been based
on the spontaneous explanation of everyday events, Subbotsky
(2010) used a “magical box” that allowed the experimenter—
unbeknownst to the observer—to switch objects (e.g., a stamp
becoming a driver’s license). Most older children deny that magic
can happen in the real world. However, when presented with the
magical box theywere just as likely to usemagical aswell as physical
explanations (Subbotsky, 1997).
Most adults likewise deny the existence of realmagic (Zusne and
Jones, 1982). However, one study presented adults with a magical
box into which the experimenter placed a plastic card; after cast-
ing a spell, the card was shown to have become badly scratched.
Participants did not believe the scratches were caused by the spell.
However, when asked to put their own hand in the device, most
asked the experimenter not to cast the spell (Subbotsky, 2001).
In another study, simple conjuring tricks portrayed as a demon-
stration of genuine psychic ability were found to enhance people’s
beliefs in the paranormal (Mohr et al., 2014; see also Benassi et al.,
1980). Such experiments are wonderful examples of how magic
tricks can help study the formation of beliefs, and possibly super-
stitions. Indeed, such studies might even help distinguish between
different kinds (or levels) of believability. For example, Lam-
ont (2013) showed that people can believe in some apparently
impossible things while not believing in others, or believe that
an apparently impossible event actually occurred but not believe
the explanation offered for it. It is also worth mentioning that
some magicians consider a separation to exist between intellectual
and emotional belief when seemingly impossible phenomena are
encountered (e.g., Ortiz, 1994).
The results of such studies may have important clinical impli-
cations. For example, correlations appear to exist between magical
thinking and obsessive-compulsive behavior (Bolton et al., 2002;
Evans et al., 2002). And schizophrenic patients similarly appear
to engage in a greater amount of magical thinking (Tissot and
Burnand, 1980).
THE EXPERIENCE OF WONDER
A central part of magic is the experience of wonder stemming
from perceiving an event that is apparently impossible. Such phe-
nomena can lead to humor, amazement, and surprise; they can
even generate a sense of the laws of physics or logic being deﬁed.
Experiential states of this kind are difﬁcult or even impossible to
create in any other way.
It may be worth emphasizing that a magical experience does
not occur simply from everyday reality being distorted. In a ﬁlm,
for example, a superhero can appear to ﬂy across the sky. But
when watching the ﬁlm an explanation is readily available: special
effects. Thus, although such effects are interesting, they are not
inexplicable2. Indeed, if the spectator has an explanation for a
trick—regardless of whether this explanation is true or not—the
sense of wonder diminishes to some extent. Seeing a good magic
trick creates a dilemma, a conﬂict between what the spectator
thinks of as possible and the event that has been experienced. The
more convinced the spectator is that the event cannot happen, the
more powerful the effect, and the stronger the sense of wonder.
Even if the observer does not believe in magic, there is still a split
second in which reality is suspended, and wonder exists.
Experiential states such as wonder likely relate to our ability
to distinguish between the possible and the impossible; this in
turn may relate to how we learn to understand reality. Parris et al.
(2009) had participantswatchmagic trickswhile their brain activi-
ties were measured using fMRI. The areas activated were similar to
those activatedwhen experiencing impossible events such as viola-
tions in causality. Given that the failure to recognize the impossible
is a likely foundation of psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia,
such results might also lead to insights into the neurobiology of
psychotic experiences.
Another potentially important contribution involves individ-
ual differences. Although magic is a universal art form, responses
to it vary considerably. Some ﬁnd it thrilling and exciting; oth-
ers, irritating or even terrifying. Some are highly susceptible to
magic; others, highly resistant. Individual differences exist in mag-
ical thinking (Subbotsky, 2004; Subbotsky and Quinteros, 2002),
and it would be worth exploring whether similar differences exist
in regards to other aspects of magic; they might reveal interesting
personality traits, or cognitive or perceptual styles. For example,
Kuhn et al. (2010) found that individuals with autism were more
2The earliest audiences of the cinema often reported feelings of astonishment and
wonder, similar to those experienced in magic, likely because no explanation was
readily available for the amazing transformations they saw (Gunning, 1989). As
audiences began to understand the mechanisms involved, such reports vanished.
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susceptible to the Vanishing Ball illusion, and had more problems
in using gaze cues to allocate attention quickly enough to partic-
ular locations. Another interesting possibility is that—given the
association of wonder with a child-like state of mind—a person’s
childhood may affect the extent to which they experience wonder
in a magic performance.
Finally, there is the possibility of better understanding wonder
itself. Are different types of wonder created by different kinds of
tricks? (e.g., viewing an apparent violation of object constancy vs.
a mind-reading trick.) Is the sense of wonder created by an appar-
ently inexplicable event comparable to that created by viewing a
beautiful natural vista? All of these are interesting and important
directions for future research.
INVESTIGATION OF MAGIC TRICKS
Although the two main aspects of magic tricks—methods and
effects—are individually useful for studying the human mind,
additional insights can sometimes be obtained by considering
them together—i.e., considering magic tricks as objects of sci-
entiﬁc investigation in their own right. Any given trick involves
various perceptual and cognitive mechanisms, in a context that
includes factors such as the emotions of the spectator and the per-
sonality exhibited by the magician (see, e.g., Fitzkee, 1943/1988;
Ortiz, 1994). Its study—usually in the form of a controlled
experiment—therefore cuts across interesting issues in an inter-
esting way. When controlled appropriately, such studies can
rigorously establish that an effect exists (e.g., that forcing works
under a given set of conditions) or that particular properties of the
performance are relevant (and to what extent). With a bit of luck,
these may even enable the underlying mechanisms to be mapped
out.
DECOMPOSITION
To explain a particular trick,magicians typically use informal prin-
ciples of various kinds (e.g., Sharpe, 1988; Maskelyne and Devant,
1911/1992; Lamont andWiseman,1999). Butmore rigorous forms
of investigation are also possible. Since a givenmagic trick has only
one effect and one method, it is possible to focus on their interac-
tion with some hope that relatively few mechanisms are involved.
In addition, it is often possible to focus on just one component of
a trick, and to simplify it so as to reduce the number of factors
involved.
Decomposing a phenomenon of interest into simpler parts
is an important part of scientiﬁc investigation. To see how this
might proceed for a magic trick, consider what will be called
here “The Materializing Card,” a variation of a commonly used
trick based on forcing (Erdnase, 1902/1995). Here, the specta-
tor is shown a deck of cards rifﬂed quickly in front of them;
they are asked to name a card as these cards ﬂip by, after which
the magician produces this card from a pocket, amazing the
spectator (and the rest of the audience). This trick can there-
fore be decomposed into a sequence of components—seeing
the card rifﬂe and having a particular card come to mind, fol-
lowed by seeing it in the magician’s pocket and experiencing
a feeling of wonder. The ﬁrst of these involves issues familiar
to researchers in vision science (the actual seeing of the rif-
ﬂe), but also the forcing of a particular target card (caused by
viewing the sequence). The second component involves seeing
external reality align with the spectator’s choice—what might
be called an alignment effect—followed by the sense of wonder
evoked by that alignment. Each component might be consid-
ered as a minimal magic phenomenon. Indeed, such components
might often be better candidates for investigation that complete
tricks.
Decomposition simpliﬁes analysis, and allows effort to be
focused on those phenomena of greatest interest. But ﬁnding an
appropriate decomposition is something of an art, requiring a
“feel” for the matter at hand. The knowledge and experience of
magicians would therefore be of great assistance here.
ABSTRACTION
For a magician, an adequate description of a trick must con-
tain enough detail about the method to enable its effect to
be reproduced. Ideally, such a concrete description would also
be enough to distinguish it from others, and give some idea
about the particular circumstances—including theatrical setup—
under which it is most effective. However, controlled inves-
tigation requires a version of the trick less concerned with
the circumstances of a particular performance, and more with
the general factors that inﬂuence the observer’s perceptual and
cognitive mechanisms. For such an abstract trick (or compo-
nent), the effect must be complex enough to still be interesting,
while simple enough to allow behavior to be mapped out and
explanations tested in a rigorous way. Interestingly, studies by
magicians into principles of magic also involve considerable
abstraction (e.g., de Ascanio, 1964; Sharpe, 1988); this would
be another natural point of connection between scientists and
magicians.
To see how abstraction might proceed, consider the forcing
component of the Materializing Card. When a magician does this,
various factors are at play, including the particular cards used, the
story told, and the physical characteristics of the magician’s hands.
But by focusing, say, only on the duration the cards are shown
and their visibility, other details can be discarded, or at least made
irrelevant. The result is a simpler, more abstract method (or pro-
cedure) involving just a few key basefactors that can be controlled
in a straightforward way (Olson et al., 2013).
Ideally, the description of a procedure would include not
only the key factors, but also a speciﬁcation of how their val-
ues inﬂuence the strength of the effect. Mapping out such a
speciﬁcation would of course take work, but could be done in
principle. For example, each of the 52 playing cards commonly
used in magic tricks has been carefully measured in terms of
properties such as visibility, memorability, and likeability (Olson
et al., 2012). Subsequent studies on forcing, say, could deter-
mine whether or not these properties capture all the relevant
attributes of a card, and how the value of each property (e.g., the
level of visibility of the target card) affects the degree of forcing
found.
Careful—and often quantitative—descriptive techniques were
essential to the development of a scientiﬁc approach to areas
such as chemistry (Dear, 2006, chap. 3). Similar considerations
may apply here. For instance, the careful measurement of per-
ceptual and cognitive characteristics of cards resulted not only
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in groupings that were known to magicians, but also in some
that were not (Olson et al., 2012). Careful measurement based on
abstract tricks has likewise revealed previously unknown factors
inﬂuencing susceptibility to the Vanishing Ball illusion (Triplett,
1900; Kuhn and Land, 2006), and the inability to perceive rotary
motion in the paddle move (Hergovich et al., 2011).
Finally, it may be worth pointing out that the abstract nature
of a procedure provides an important middle way to connect the
study of magic with its practice. The particular details of a perfor-
mance are not critical for scientiﬁc purposes: what is important are
the key factors manipulated, not the particular ways they are con-
trolled. A practitioner’s technique can therefore inform scientiﬁc
study while remaining secret, just as knowledge about an indus-
trial process can be published in a useful abstract form (a patent,
say) while hiding the proprietary details about its operation.
EXPLANATION
As in the case of other phenomena involving perception or cogni-
tion, the explanation of amagic trick can be sought at three distinct
levels of analysis: (a) the psychological mechanisms involved, (b)
the neural implementation of these, and (c) the functional consid-
erations (or computational theory) as to why these mechanisms
are as they are. Only when explanation is achieved at all three lev-
els can such a phenomenon be considered completely understood
(Marr, 1982; Dennett, 1994; Glennerster, 2002).
Psychological mechanisms
A natural place to begin the explanation of a trick (or com-
ponent) is with the psychological mechanisms involved—i.e., the
functional mechanisms (perceptual and cognitive) that give rise to
the observed behavior and subjective experience. There is no need
here to specify how these mechanisms are grounded in the human
nervous system, although neural plausibility is always welcome.
Because of its involvement with known psychological mech-
anisms, this level of analysis can sometimes enable new per-
spectives on old issues. For example, connections have been
drawn between attentional misdirection and inattentional blind-
ness (e.g., Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Kuhn and Findlay, 2010),
and between misdirection and change blindness (e.g., Rensink,
2000); indeed, strong links seem to exist between misdirec-
tion and attention research generally (Memmert, 2010; Mem-
mert and Furley, 2010; Moran and Brady, 2010; Kuhn and
Tatler, 2011). Such links have been used to support the three-
network model of attention (Demacheva et al., 2012). They have
even led to new perspectives—e.g., the proposal of two differ-
ent types of inattentional blindness (Most, 2010). Interestingly,
such developments have only become possible in the context of
recent theories of visual perception, which emphasize the atten-
tional factors involved in conscious visual experience (see, e.g.,
Rensink, 2010, 2015).
Neural mechanisms
In addition to psychological mechanisms, explanation can also
appeal to the neural systems involved (see also Macknik and
Martinez-Condé, 2009). This involves a reduction to elements of
an entirely different kind—an explanation not in terms of the
information-processing strategies of particular mechanisms, but
in terms of the hardware used. Such reduction is rarely a single-
step endeavor. An important step—andworthwhile goal in its own
right—is redescription: establishing a non-causal link between a
given trick and a set of neural mechanisms (i.e., neural corre-
lates). For example, Parris et al. (2009) investigated the neural
basis of seeing violations of causality in a magic effect. Here, cir-
cuits in the left dorso-lateral prefrontal and left anterior cingulate
cortices were strongly activated, consistent with previous ﬁndings
that these structures are recruited in situations involving cogni-
tive conﬂict. A new discovery was that the activations associated
with the violations were located in the left hemisphere, point-
ing to that hemisphere’s role in perceiving complex actions and
events.
Although such results are important, it should be noted that the
ﬁnding of neural mechanisms is only part of a much larger enter-
prise. It has been argued that “the perception of magic tricks will
be best understood from a neurobiological perspective” (Macknik
and Martinez-Condé, 2009, p. 241). In this view, a trick must be
explained primarily in terms of neural mechanisms: psycholog-
ical considerations have lower status3. But problems can arise if
the search for neural mechanisms is considered the primary goal
of scientiﬁc activity. As has been learned by other sciences con-
cerned with human experience, a direct “jump” from consciously
experienced effect to neural mechanism not only ignores impor-
tant aspects of the processes involved, but also stands in danger of
going astray, in that no checks are available from other levels of
explanation.
Functional/computational considerations
Explanation in terms of mechanisms—both psychological and
neural—can help us understand a given magic trick. But such
understanding may still be incomplete. For instance, why do
we even have a sense of wonder in the ﬁrst place? Which cir-
cumstances invoke it? What kinds of violations give rise to what
kinds of wonder?What—if anything—does this experience enable
us to do?
Such issues are the concern of a functional (or computational)
level of analysis, which focuses not only on describing the function
carried out, but also on justifying why it has the form it has. In
the case of wonder, for example, this experience may motivate
the observer to think more about events that cannot be accounted
for by the existing set of beliefs. An important observation in this
regard is that spectators generally wish to see a trick repeated—
not just to experience the effect again (which could be done via
a different method), but to see how it was created in the ﬁrst
place. This points to the sense of wonder being connected to a
strong need to understand what is going on. If so, the interesting
possibility arises that the sense of wonder so essential to magic
may also have been essential to the development of science.
In summary, then, explanation of magic tricks at all three levels
of analysis could lead to interesting new insights into the nature
of the human mind. Such analysis may not always be possible. But
given the power of this approach even when it is only partially
3To be sure,Macknik et al. (2008) domention behavior on occasion. But consider: in
the main body of Macknik et al. (2008), the word “neural” is used 30 times, whereas
the word “behavioral” is used only twice—once at the beginning of the article and
once at the end, both uses being simple glosses.
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applicable (Dennett, 1994; Glennerster, 2002), it would appear
worthwhile to at least attempt it in this domain.
ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
In addition to studying individual tricks and components,
important insights might also be found by studying the rela-
tionships between them—e.g., natural groupings of tricks, or
the set of methods that can create an effect. The study of
such relationships is currently the least-developed way of using
magic to study the human mind. However, if it can be sufﬁ-
ciently developed, it may become an important area of study
that could connect in a productive way with other areas of
research.
INVENTORY
When organizing knowledge, a foundational issue is that of
description. Although often linked to explanation (if only to clar-
ify what is involved), description can proceed independently of
this. Indeed, in sciences such as biology, structures are often
described to a considerable extent without any real commitment
to underlying causes (Mayr, 1982).
In many areas of study, description takes the form of an
inventory—a complete listing of the entities under consideration
(e.g., the set of known animals, or known songs). In the case of
magic, such entities are clearly individual tricks, either concrete
or abstract. Books that teach magic (e.g., Hay, 1947/1975; Nelms,
1969/1996) generally contain partial inventories, describing var-
ious tricks of interest. Early attempts toward a comprehensive
set include that of Triplett (1900), who compiled a listing of
many of the better-known tricks; these were described from the
point of the performer and were loosely grouped, e.g., tricks
involving optical illusions, or tricks involving unusual abilities.
Later attempts include the work of Wright (1924), the collec-
tions of Fitzkee (1943/1988, 1945/1987), and Ortiz (1994), as
well as the tricks in the taxonomies of Sharpe (1985, 1988) and
Lamont and Wiseman (1999).
Strictly speaking, no particular organizational scheme (taxon-
omy) is required for an inventory. But what is required is that
the many-to-many relationships between effects and methods
should be maintained. One way of doing so is to have sepa-
rate (although related) inventories centered on each aspect: one
for the methods associated with each effect, and the other for
the effects associated with each method (Figure 2). In the inter-
ests of simplicity, discussion here will focus on effect-centered
inventories.
Such inventories could be of two kinds. A concrete inventory
describes concrete tricks; it is essentially a record of magic prac-
tice, ensuring that all known effects and methods are accessible to
the community of practitioners. An example of this is the website
“Ask Alexander,”4 an on-line library containing descriptions of lit-
erallymillions of concretemagic tricks. An abstract inventory could
likewise describe all known abstract tricks (or components)—i.e.,
abstract effects along with the procedures for producing them (see
Abstraction). Such an inventory could form much of the basis for
scientiﬁc work.
TAXONOMY
Althoughusually considered part of an inventory, a distinct level of
description can be separated out: that of taxonomy. Its main goal
is to organize tricks via particular kinds of relationships, includ-
ing a set of “pattern elements” that could generate any patterns
found among these relationships. Taxonomic developments have
been critical to the scientiﬁc development of several ﬁelds—e.g.,
biology, chemistry, and mineralogy (see, e.g., Dear, 2006). They
would likely play a similar role here. As in the case of inventories,
taxonomies could be concrete or abstract, and effect-centered or
method-centered. Since each has different perspectives, all these
kinds would likely be useful in supporting scientiﬁc study.
Various taxonomies have been proposed over the years (e.g.,
Triplett, 1900; Wright, 1924; Bruno, 1978; Lamont and Wiseman,
1999). None, however, has received overwhelming acceptance
(Lamont et al., 2010). These schemes are largely folk taxonomies,
similar to the groupings used by naturalists in early classiﬁ-
cations of animals, or the tables of chemical afﬁnities used
4http://askalexander.org/
FIGURE 2 | Inventories centered on different aspects of magic tricks. (A) Effect-centered inventory. Here, effects are primary, with each effect—or
component—linked to the various methods able to create it. (B) Method-centered inventory. Here, each method—or component—is primary, and is linked to
the set of effects that it helps create.
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prior to modern chemistry5. Interestingly, doubt also existed
long ago as to whether natural—or even adequate—taxonomies
could exist in those domains (e.g., Dear, 2006, chap. 2). But
just as folk taxonomies in those areas eventually gave way to
natural taxonomies, a similar development might be possible
here. Note that although more knowledge always helps, a com-
plete understanding of magic is not necessary for this—for
example, new taxonomies continue to appear in various sub-
domains of vision science (Changizi, 2009; Gregory, 2009) even
though our scientiﬁc understanding of visual perception remains
incomplete.
One way of developing better-founded taxonomies might be to
start with the magician’s language and conceptual schemes, and
make these clearer and more rigorous (Kuhn et al., 2008; Kuhn,
2010). This would likely involve various subtle distinctions. Con-
sider, for instance, the term“misdirection.”This is a broad concept,
referring to any manipulation that directs the spectator away from
the cause of an effect (see Cognition). In the case of visual atten-
tion, it might be deﬁned as a “deﬂection of attention for the
purpose of disguise” (Sharpe, 1988, p. 47), which would seem
sufﬁcient for most purposes. But various issues still remain. For
example, it has been suggested (Lamont et al., 2010) that distrac-
tion of the type typically used in scientiﬁc experiments has little
to do with the misdirection used in magic. But while misdirection
is indeed more than distraction, it nevertheless is still related—for
example, the use of gaze by magicians to direct attention away
from a method is similar to the use of gaze to control attention
in scientiﬁc studies (e.g., Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Kuhn and
Kingstone, 2009). A ﬁnal resolution of this issue will probably be
difﬁcult, but the outcome may well improve our understanding of
the issues involved. This will likely be the case for other terms as
well.
A somewhat related approach would be to reconsider the fea-
tures used as the basis of classiﬁcation: a wider range of features
might be used, say, or more quantitative measures. The princi-
ples of organization might also be made more quantitative and
methodical—e.g., assigning different weights to different proper-
ties. (For an interesting account of this approach in biology, see
Yoon, 2009).
Another way of developing more natural taxonomies might
be to base them on established psychological mechanisms and
principles. For example, a taxonomy of misdirection (and thus,
much of magic) can be created via two objective taxonomic
principles: (i) base it as much as possible on known psycho-
logical mechanisms, and (ii) have the highest levels be based
on the mechanisms affected, followed by the mechanisms that
control them (Kuhn et al., 2014). Such a taxonomy relies on
the nature of these mechanisms—and their relationships to each
other—to lessen the subjective element in its organization. A
possible complication could arise if a particular trick affects
5The term “folk” does not imply that a taxonomy is inaccurate—for example, the
traditional folk taxonomy for animals (as developed in the West, anyway) is often
not far from the scientiﬁcally based Linnaean one. Rather, it simply describes how
the taxonomy was created: via utilitarian principles generated on the basis of social
knowledge, vs. themore context-free approach typical of science. Although valuable,
traditionalmagic taxonomies don’t have a scientiﬁc basis—it is difﬁcult, for example,
to imagine a discovery that could make such a taxonomy change its structure.
more than one mechanism. But this could be handled by mak-
ing the component—rather than the complete trick—the basic
element of the taxonomy6. Indeed, this approach would have the
added beneﬁt that the variations of a trick would not need to
be considered as separate entities in the taxonomy, but as related
combinations of similar components (cf. molecules vs. atoms in
chemistry7).
A SCIENCE OF MAGIC?
Given that different kinds of knowledge about magic can help
investigate the human mind, questions arise about the extent
to which this could be done. Could the study of magic be
carried out in a coherent way that encompasses most magic
tricks? Could it eventually become an area of research akin
to, say, vision science, resulting in a better understanding
of known effects, and perhaps even the prediction of new
ones?
In what follows, we present a few—admittedly incomplete—
suggestions about how this issue might be approached. These
proposals are necessarily tentative. But our intent here is to show
that there does exist somepossibility of organizing a study of magic
as a scientiﬁc discipline, one that could enable a better under-
standing of magic tricks, and ultimately, a better understanding of
human perception and cognition.
Scope
Sciences of many kinds exist. Some, such as physics, have consid-
erable theoretical structure; others, such as meteorology, far less.
Some, such as biochemistry, have a strong experimental compo-
nent; others, such as geology, rely on natural observation. But all
involve a process of inquiry, a particular way of thinking about
issues. In particular, all sciences have a clearly deﬁned set of enti-
ties in the world considered relevant, and a set of issues concerning
these entities. The set of entities selected—the scope—is critical for
the success of this enterprise: if too broad, the discipline will lose
coherence—e.g., the original science of vision in Hellenistic times,
which includedmathematical geometry, physical optics, and phys-
iological considerations. If too narrow, the result will be a set of
unnatural divisions or an insufﬁcient “critical mass” of basic con-
cepts. Given these considerations, what might be the proper scope
for a possible science of magic?
One choice might simply be the set of effects and methods
currently used by magicians. But the particular tricks in current
use is only a partial set of those possible; their selection is largely
due to arbitrary factors such as prevailing fashion. Consequently,
systematic connections may not always exist between them. More-
over, this set is time-bound: it is not the same as what was used in
the past, nor will it likely be the same as what will be used in the
future (Lamont, 2013).
6If misdirection is viewed as the component of a trick that hides the method gen-
erating the “main” effect experienced, this is exactly what is done in the taxonomy
of Kuhn et al. (2014). If this applies more generally, magic tricks might best be
described via a set of such taxonomies, each pertaining to a particular component.
7Interestingly, the magician Fitzkee (1944/1989) proposed that all effects could be
constructed out of 19 “basic effects,” and proposed a formula by which new effects
could be generated. It might be worth revisiting this, given the better understanding
of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms than was available in 1944.
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1508 | 9
Rensink and Kuhn Using magic to study the mind
Another choicemight be the ways that humans can be deceived.
This avoids a direct dependence on the tricks in current use while
still capturing much of what happens in a magic performance;
indeed, magic is sometimes characterized this way (e.g., Hyman,
1989; Triplett, 1900). But deception can take a very wide variety
of forms, ranging from ﬁction to advertising to counterfeiting to
psychological warfare to simple everyday lying. As such, it risks
incoherence. Even more importantly, it misses the main point of
magic: people do not attend magic shows simply to be deceived.
What to do? We propose that a more natural focus is the expe-
rience of wonder generated by perceiving an apparently impossible
phenomenon (cf. see The Experience of Wonder). This experience
appears to be common to all effects considered “magical,” no mat-
ter what they involve, or when or where they occur. Moreover, this
characterization is a positive one, with magic deﬁned not in terms
of the failure of a mechanism (as occurs in deception), but in
terms of a positive experience. In this view, the scope of scientiﬁc
investigation into magic would be any aspect of any phenomenon
associated with this experience. This focus is not limited to the
set of magic tricks in current use; instead it concerns the resulting
experiential state and any possible technique that could produce
it, both of which are timeless8. It also emphasizes the experience of
8In classical antiquity, several forms of entertainment were reported as creating a
sense of wonder and delight, via mechanical devices that appeared to start (and con-
tinue) on their own. Central to this was ensuring that the causes of the movements
could not be readily determined, and that the effects violated the expectations of the
spectator (Berryman, 2009, pp. 140–142, 175–176). Although these might not be
considered as forms of magic according to traditional views, they would be so here.
wonder—an experience that has not received much serious inves-
tigation to date—and makes it the central concern, which then
lends coherence to the entire enterprise.
Framework
A clearly deﬁned scope is necessary for any area of science. But
it is also helpful to have a research framework—a coherent set of
characterizations, issues, and practices to help guide research and
assess how a given work contributes to it (cf. Lakatos, 1978). What
might this look like for the case of magic?
One possibility is shown in Figure 3, which largely incorporates
suggestions made earlier in this paper. It can be divided into two
groups of issues: those concerning description (issues of inven-
tory and taxonomy), and those concerning explanation (analysis
in terms of psychological mechanisms, neural mechanisms, and
computational theory). The descriptive parts would supply mate-
rial for explanation; these could be developed as sketched in
sections“Inventory”and“Taxonomy.”Explanation of these would
proceed along the lines sketched in section “Explanation,” with
analysis carried out at three different levels (psychological, neural,
and functional).
An important application of this would be to ﬁnd deep patterns
or principles underlying the explanation of many magic tricks (or
components). Such commonalities could point to mechanisms
that are not apparent when investigating individual tricks or the
relatively superﬁcial patterns in the taxonomy. A search for gen-
eral principles common to individual mechanical devices appears
to have helped create the science of mechanics (Berryman, 2009),
FIGURE 3 | Framework for a possible science of magic. Each part concerns
a particular set of related issues. The arrow indicates that investigation would
begin with the collection of individual tricks the concrete inventory; these
could be abstracted and collected into an abstract inventory (see Inventory),
and eventually organized into a concrete or abstract taxonomy (see
Taxonomy). Analysis of the individual tricks (or components) in the inventories
and the patterns of relationships in the taxonomies would proceed in terms of
their psychological, neural, and computational mechanisms (see Explanation).
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which was then able to connect to other sciences; if mechani-
cal techniques and effects have parallels to magical ones, some
possibility exists of a similar development here.
The ultimate argument for or against a possible science of
magic, however, will be the extent to which it can uncover new
knowledge and produce interesting new effects. We do not claim
that this enterprise will necessarily succeed; there may well be
obstacles of which we are currently unaware. But at the moment
nothing appears to stand in itsway. Andnothing ventured, nothing
gained.
APPLICATIONS TO MAGIC PRACTICE
As many magicians have pointed out over the years (e.g., Houdin,
1868/2006; Wonder and Minch, 1996), a better understanding
of the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms underlying various
aspects of magic could well inform the design of better magic
tricks, and perhaps even presentation techniques. The relation
between applied and basic science is a reciprocal one: just as the
insights obtained in an applied area can provide subject matter
for the corresponding basic science, so can the lessons learned in
an abstract science be applied to concrete concerns (Stokes, 1997).
Such transfer has long been the case in various domains (e.g.,
using knowledge of biochemistry to help design more effective
medications). There appear to be no a priori reasons why such
transfer could not also occur here.
This need not be limited to human performance. Interaction
with computers can be an important part of various magic tricks
(Marshall et al., 2010). And given the complexities involved in
human-computer interaction, knowledge of particular effects or
methods could inform the design of more effective computer
interfaces, creating a more compelling “user illusion” (Tognazzini,
1993). Such knowledgemight even suggestways to enable the com-
puter itself to control a user’s expectations or attention, leading to
the development of “magical displays” that could capture some
aspects of the performance of a human magician (Rensink, 2002).
There may also be interesting connections with special effects. For
example, the creation of pixie dust that is perceived as “magical”
is extremely difﬁcult to achieve using computer graphics; it seems
to rely in part on the dust appearing natural, but still not ordinary
(Gilland, 2009). Knowledge about what makes something appear
magical (and why) would be most helpful in creating effects of this
kind.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed here a framework describing various ways in
which knowledge of magic can help contribute to the under-
standing of the human mind. These are grouped into four
distinct levels: (i) using known methods as the basis of new
methodologies, (ii) using known effects to explore new aspects
of the mind, (iii) investigating how particular tricks (suitably
abstracted) relate to psychological and neural mechanisms, and
(iv) studying the patterns of relationships between individual
tricks (and perhaps their components). Among other things, this
framework suggests the possibility of anorganizedbodyof study—
perhaps even a science—centered around the sense of wonder
that is experienced when encountering an apparently impossible
event.
The prospects for this enterprise appear to be good. Magicians
canmanipulate our perception and cognition inpowerful and con-
sistent ways, and have noticed enough structure and systematicity
to propose various categorizations. Our role as scientists is to ask
the right questions and use the right methods to investigate this
further, and make this area as rigorous and systematic as possible.
Similar attempts are underway for other performing arts: work has
started on a psychology of music with comparable goals (see, e.g.,
Levitin, 2007), and similar efforts are also being attempted for ﬁlm
(e.g., Shimamura, 2013; Smith, 2014). It will be interesting to see
the extent to which the developments in these domains converge
with those for magic.
In this context, it should be mentioned that many aspects
of magic not discussed here are also worthy of scientiﬁc
investigation—e.g., the character of the magician (Fitzkee,
1943/1988; Ortiz, 1994), the use of ritual (Sorensen, 2006), or the
use of conjuring principles by psychic mediums (Marks, 2000).
These issues are clearly beyond the scope of what is proposed here.
Our goal in this paper is a more modest one: simply to deter-
mine the viability of a “core” area of study, including some of the
steps needed to carry it out in practice. The success of this will
ultimately depend on the willingness of researchers from a wide
range of disciplines to link some of their own investigations to this
endeavor.
The eventual identity of this area of inquiry is difﬁcult to ascer-
tain. It might become a loose network of related results in various
ﬁelds. It might become part of an existing science—e.g., an area
of “magic perception” in vision science similar to, say, scene per-
ception, or it might become part of the psychology of emotion.
If valued for its insights into connections that cut across various
issues, it might develop a more autonomous identity—e.g., a “psy-
chology of wonder” or “psychology of magic” similar in status to
say, social psychology, with connections to the study of percep-
tion and cognition, but keeping its own traditions and set of core
research issues. Only time will tell. But, however, events unfold, it
appears that the study of magic has sufﬁcient focus and coherence
to prevent it from dissolving into a set of disconnected studies in
disconnected ﬁelds.
Magic is an ancient art form centered around wonder and sur-
prise. As such, its practice relies on a level of secrecy that needs to
be respected. In recent years, the possibility of a science of magic
has received public as well as scientiﬁc attention. Part of the rea-
son for this is that magic offers an engaging and entertaining way
to illustrate and discuss complex psychological theories, thereby
providing a valuable educational tool. Although public interest
is valuable for science, there is also danger of revealing sensitive
details, and thus damaging this wonderful art. As we have argued
above, there exists a “middle way” that keeps secret the details of
concrete implementations but still allows public and scientiﬁc dis-
cussion of general principles. We strongly encourage researchers
in this ﬁeld to use such an approach, and so maximize the likeli-
hood that people will continue to experience all the wonder and
amazement that magic offers.
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